It’s Complicated: Concerned Citizen Drops a Dime on Toyota

As we all should have learned nine years ago from the Ford Explorer-Firestone tire maelstrom, it’s not often just one thing that creates a catastrophe of epic proportions.  Defect issues that rise to the top of the charts are frequently the result of a multitude of problems that align to create a widespread hazard.

In the Ford-Firestone case, it was the marriage of tires with several poor design characteristics compounded by manufacturing problems and the application on an unstable vehicle.  Add in the huge number of Explorers sold and the tires’ longevity, which kept them on the roads long enough to fail, and the result was rollovers, injuries and deaths.  Now comes Toyota, with thousands of unintended acceleration complaints across different models, makes and model years and an easy-one-size-fits-all root cause: floormats.

That explanation is swiftly becoming unraveled as quick-thinking owners – like the 2007 Avalon owner from New Jersey who managed to wrest his out-of-control vehicle right to the dealership, where the evidence was revving and smoking in front of the tech’s eyes and couldn’t be floor-matted away. (see Sudden Acceleration in Reverse).

Now a “Concerned Citizen” in Franklin, Kentucky has offered NHTSA another interesting piece of the puzzle: broke throttle body shafts.

On November 27, about a month after NHTSA closed its latest Toyota unintended acceleration investigation with another pedal interference conclusion, some Kentuckian’s conscience got the better of him/her. Here is the anonymous note addressed the then-Acting Administrator Ronald Medford:

“There are potentially hundreds of Toyota and Nissan vehicles driving American highways with cracked shaft throttle bodies. Japanese management up to and including company president was aware of the cracked shaft problem and told everyone to be quiet about this problem.

The failure mode on DFMEA for broken throttle shaft is no throttle control and potential wide open acceleration. The Toyota floor mats caused American deaths. Will you sit on this information and possibly cause more American deaths? It bothers me that I did not tell anyone sooner. I have another throttle body in same condition that can be sent to Automotive News.

Concerned Citizen”


Coincidentally, Franklin Precision Industry (FPI) in Franklin, KY manufactures throttle bodies for Toyota and Nissan.  FPI is part of Aisan Industry Co. Ltd., a large automotive supplier based in Japan, with its major shareholders Toyota Motor Corporation, at 35 percent and Toyota Industries Corporation at 18 percent.

NHTSA didn’t place the potential whistle-blower’s letter in the public file until Jan. 4.

Dear Concerned Citizen: Thanks for the tip.  We’d like to see that cracked throttle body shaft – and we promise to investigate swiftly.

More on Toyota Sudden Acceleration

Toyota Sudden Acceleration in Reverse

Earlier this week, The Safety Record reported another Toyota SUA incident involving a 2007 Avalon and a New Jersey driver who managed to get his over-accelerating vehicle to the dealership with smoking brakes and an engine at full throttle. For those of you who missed it:

This owner had experienced several unintended acceleration incidents – incidents in which the vehicle accelerated without driver input.  The most recent occurred on Dec. 29 as he drove on the highway. The man was unable to stop the vehicle with the brakes alone, but he was able to shift the vehicle into Neutral. As the engine continued to race to full-throttle, he immediately called the local Toyota dealer, about two miles away, to alert them he was bringing the vehicle to their lot.  He drove the car to the dealer by shifting from Neutral to Drive, foot on the brake, with the engine at full throttle. Continue reading

“I don’t where I got the nerve, but it sure felt good.”

So says Christina Catalano, after her brief confrontation with Chrysler CEO Sergio Marcchione at a dinner yesterday night sponsored by Automotive News World Congress, as part of the North America International Auto Show in Detroit.

Catalano is the daughter of Linda Catalano who died on August 3, 2008.  The 55-year-old mother and grandmother had completed a garage sale and had left her home several blocks away to collect the remaining sale signs along the road.  She evidently stopped the vehicle along the roadway to pick up a sign.  She placed her vehicle into what she must have believed to be Park and opened the door and stepped out of the Chrysler Mini-Van to pick up her signs, with the engine running and the driver’s side door open.  The vehicle then “self-shifted” into reverse, knocking Catalano to the ground and dragging her underneath the left front tire, where it pinned her. Continue reading

CPSC Workshop on Building a Public Database Less Adversarial

The tone was less adversarial and more collegial as the U.S. Product Safety Commission held its first public workshop (see The End of the World as We Know it!) on the establishment of a Public Consumer Product Safety Incident Database this week.

Perhaps that was because the Commissioners did not attend – nor did some of the database’s most strident opponents. Instead, what unfolded over two days was a work/brainstorming session, with CPSC staffers gathering the collective wisdom of the stakeholders.

Safety Research & Strategies President Sean Kane, who appeared at the behest of the Commission, was a frequent panelist. Manufacturers and public advocates (Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Kids in Danger, and Public Citizen) alike hashed out what they’d like to see in the database.  Adding to the mix was panelist George Rutherford, retired CPSC staffer, who offered some sorely needed reality checks.

IncdentsCrashesInjuriesDeaths_121509

Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration Complaints Update

Safety Research & Strategies has completed our latest review of Toyota unintended acceleration complaint data.  Our database consists of incidents from the following sources:

  • Consumer complaints to NHTSA
  • Toyota-submitted claims from several NHTSA investigations into unintended acceleration
  • Incidents reported by media organizations
  • Consumer contacts made to our firm and other firms that are reporting incidents they have received.

Every effort has been made to identify duplicate records and combine them.  However, often the reports do not provide enough detail to link incidents to other reports.  There are likely some duplicates among our records – if there are, they are few.

SRS’s database consists only of incidents reported from 1999 to the present (regardless of model year).  We have defined unintended acceleration as any incident in which the complainant reported an engine acceleration that was unintended – regardless of whether the car was in gear.  We understand that this is a broader inclusion than others have considered; however, because we are still at a stage of trying to understand the incidents we believe this inclusiveness will help us discern vehicle years / models and incident types that we may want to investigate further.

Table 1 below is a summary of the data:

Toyota Pedal Fix Dress Rehearsal

In early December 2005, Toyota learned of two early model Lexus IS250 with accelerator pedals “out of tolerance” – meaning the pedal could become stuck. One instance occurred during a dealer pre-delivery inspection and a second was reported by Toyota Canada during transportation at the port facility. The automaker had received no complaints in the U.S. or Canada.

Nonetheless, Toyota was on it like a shot:

Continue reading

Toyota announces a Fix for Sudden Acceleration: Focus on Stuck Mats

After years of applying band aids to its Sudden Unintended Acceleration problem, Toyota will finally offer a vehicle-based remedy to fix SUA problems involving floor mats that can entrap the accelerator pedals in eight Toyota and Lexus models.  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration announced this morning that

Toyota plans to reconfigure the accelerator pedal on 3.8 million vehicles going back to the 2004 model year.  Other fixes include modifying the floor area around the pedal and in some models, installing a brake-to-idle override that allows the driver to quickly stop a vehicle in an unintended acceleration incident and newly-designed replacement driver- and front-passenger side all-weather mats. Continue reading

Ain’t Nothing Like the Real Thing, Baby! The Pneumatic Tire

Have you heard the one about The Pneumatic Tire? If you’re involved in tire litigation, the defense may have waved this august tome in front of a judge claiming that it is the Tire Bible handed down from on high by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, itself.

And this would be somewhat true. In 2005 NHTSA did contract J.D. Walter and Alan Gent of the University of Akron to act as assembling editors for a low-budget update of the 1981 edition of the Mechanics of Pneumatic Tires. With a total project cost of $89,575, Walter and Gent recruited top-level executives in the tire industry – including the good folks at Cooper Tire—to serve as authors and members of the editorial board.  The work was to have been thoroughly vetted at the agency, but according to several sources, NHTSA passed a very light hand over the project and the final version consisted of a wholesale borrowing from the original, complete with decades old data, with some new chapters added to reflect technological advances. Continue reading

The End of the World as We Know it

The very best consumer products complaints database would be one which allows manufacturers to thoroughly vet each complaint – no matter how many years it takes; one that would be accessible to the public, unless that member of the public is a plaintiff’s attorney or a reporter; or one that prohibits complaints that might tarnish an industry’s reputation. In other words, a database that preserves the status quo.

At least, that’s how manufacturers see it. The U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission held the first of several public hearings Wednesday on the creation of a publicly accessible and searchable consumer complaints database, now required by the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act.

Under the infamous Section 6B of the Consumer Product Safety Act, manufacturers basically have all the control when it comes to allowing the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission to disclose negative information about their products. The provision allows a company to wash any data it deems “inaccurate” and even allows a manufacturer to sue to prevent the release of such information. The creation of a publicly accessible database means that manufacturers are no longer the gatekeepers of information.

At Wednesday’s hearing, six industry representatives wasted no time in warning the commission about the barbarians at the gate: trial lawyers. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and attorneys for the garage door and home appliances industries carefully wrapped their arguments around the concept of “accuracy.” Rick Woldenburg, the head of an educational toy company, and a vociferous critic of the CPSIA, went for the jugular, warning that the database could become “a breeding ground” for litigation, and touch off a “feeding frenzy” at the plaintiff’s bar.

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Newly-appointed Democratic Commissioner Bob Adler reminded industry that the CPSIA database was not going to be perfect, nor built on the foundation of manufacturers’ worst fears.

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Lawyers from Public Citizen, the Consumers Federation of America and Consumer Union countered that a database would restore some of the balance and transparency to the process and generally applauded the mandate.

Safety Research & Strategies President Sean Kane injected some much needed reality into the proceedings. He reminded the CPSC that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has hosted a publicly accessible complaints database for years without bringing the auto industry to its knees. He also showed them how SRS’s model, the Vehicle Safety Information Resource Center (VSIRC) database, took the scattered NHTSA data and transformed it into a useful tool with a simple, user-friendly interface.

Newly appointed commissioner Anne Northup, who apparently was charged with handling the left field, was not persuaded. She had spent most of the hearing querying each panelist if they thought the commission could be sued for posting inaccurate information on its new database. But she tipped her hand after Kane’s presentation. Apparently Commissioner Northup actually feared for the liability of manufacturers. She accused Kane of shilling for plaintiff’s lawyers and ventured that the new database could create opportunities for lawsuits. Wielding her Blackberry like an avenging sword, Northup read from what she said was SRS’s website, with copious links to victims’ attorneys. It was not SRS’s website. But Northup wasn’t about to let the facts get in the way of her point. When Kane tried gently to correct her, she admonished him: “Don’t interrupt me.”

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Kane also corrected Northup’s premise: Data doesn’t create lawsuits. Lawsuits over a death or serious injury prompt the government to collect the data to see if further action is needed, he told her.  But don’t let the facts get in your way.

NHTSA Pronounces and Toyota Pounces: It’s the Floor Mats, Stupid

Showing admirable restraint, Toyota waited a whole five days before trumpeting the closing of Defect Petition 09-001 as proof positive “that no defect exists in vehicles in which the driver’s floor mat is compatible with the vehicle and properly secured.”

In a letter to its customers, Toyota referred to NHTSA’s “extensive technical review of the issue, including interviews with consumers who had complained of unwanted acceleration, NHTSA concluded that …the only defect trend related to vehicle speed control in the subject vehicles involved the potential for accelerator pedals to become trapped near the floor by out-of-position or inappropriate floor mat installations.”  Toyota’s press release went on to say:

“This is the sixth time in the past six years that NHTSA has undertaken such an exhaustive review of allegations of unintended acceleration on Toyota and Lexus vehicles and the sixth time the agency has found no vehicle-based cause for the unwanted acceleration allegations.

The question of unintended acceleration involving Toyota and Lexus vehicles has been repeatedly and thoroughly investigated by NHTSA, without any finding of defect other than the risk from an unsecured or incompatible driver’s floor mat, said Bob Daly, TMS senior vice president.”

Some of this is actually true. The agency has not found a vehicle-based defect that is causing unwanted acceleration.  It doesn’t mean there isn’t one – it just means that the agency hasn’t found it.  By any standard, the agency investigations are far from the thorough and can be accurately described as cursory by anyone with a passing understanding of defect investigation.

Here’s NHTSA’s summary of one of those “thorough” investigations into Toyota Tacoma SUA:

“ODI reviewed the petition, assessed VOQs, interviewed persons who filed VOQs, tested the vehicle, and reviewed Toyota’s response to an agency Information Request. The complaints fell into three groups. A majority of the complaints may have involved the Tacoma’s throttle control system. Some complaints did not involve a failure of the throttle control system. For the remaining reports, although there may have been an issue with the throttle control system as one possible explanation, we have been unable to determine a cause related to throttle control or any underlying cause that gave rise to the complaint. For those vehicles where the throttle control system did not perform as the owner believes it should have, the information suggesting a possible defect related to motor vehicle safety is quite limited.

Additional investigation is unlikely to result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect as requested by the petitioner. Therefore, in view of the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA’s limited resources to best accomplish the agency’s safety mission, the petition is denied.”

In other words NHTSA:

  • Talked to owners who complained;
  • Drove the petitioners vehicle and didn’t experience SUA;
  • Asked Toyota what, if any, problems existed (none of course);
  • Found that the throttle control system may have had a problem but couldn’t find a cause;
  • Had limited information to work with;
  • Faced with limited resources and other more easily solvable safety issues, dropped any further investigation.

The most thorough of the government investigations appears to be the agency’s Vehicle Research & Test Center analysis of a 2007 Lexus ES350.  This investigation, cited by Toyota above as evidence of the lack of a defect, suggests otherwise.  Here’s what else the report stated:

“To comprehend the statistical significance of the probability for this event to occur, a survey was sent to a sample size of 1986 registered owners of a 2007 Lexus ES-350 requesting information regarding episodes of unintended acceleration. NHTSA received 600 responses for an overall response rate of 30.2%. Fifty-nine owners stated they experienced unintended acceleration.  Thirty-five of those responding also reported that their vehicles were equipped with rubber Lexus all-weather floor mats and several commented that the incident occurred when the accelerator had become trapped in a groove in the floor mat. Interviews with owners revealed that many had unsecured rubber floor mats in place at the time of the unintended acceleration event, which included in some cases unsecured rubber floor mats placed over existing Lexus carpeted mats.”

The report is silent on several key issues, including owners who did not comment that the accelerator pedal was trapped in the groove of an all weather floor mat.  And what of the remaining 24 who didn’t have all weather floor mats?

The agency’s 2004 “thorough” investigation of SUA in 2002-2003 Camry and Lexus ES350 vehicles also failed to find a defect. In its Closing Report, the agency said:

“ODI failed to find any evidence in the interviews conducted (113 VOQ and 36 Toyota reports, 149 total), or in the information provided in Toyota’s IR response, of instrument panel warning lamp illumination or ETC diagnostic codes detection. None of the complainants interviewed described conditions similar to failsafe mode operation. One report (10062931) was found where an ETC component replacement occurred in connection with a repair attempt related to the alleged defect, no others were found. Toyota’s warranty claim rate is low with 24 of the 43 warranty claims submitted involving diagnostic repairs (that did not result in component replacement because no fault was detected). Many warranty claims were not related to the alleged defect Toyota’s ETC parts sales rate for the subject vehicles is low also. There are no service bulletins or campaigns that relate to the alleged defect.”

Translation: Driver’s actual experiences didn’t unfold the way Toyota says they should have (hey – the little light didn’t go on!); the automaker hasn’t replaced parts under warranty (check those floor mat numbers); and it didn’t acknowledge the problem via a technical bulletin, therefore it didn’t happen.

The latest “thorough” defect petition investigation was in response to Jeffery Pepski’s experience with SUA in his 2007 Lexus.  Pepski’s vehicle was examined by a NHTSA investigator and a Toyota representative at a Lexus dealer in which they couldn’t reproduce the incident and claimed the floor mat was the cause.  The investigation then headed west to investigate the causes of tragic fatal crash that killed Mark Saylor and three family members in a 2009 Lexus ES350. In that crash, the agency blamed an improperly placed all-weather accessory floor mats that were not specified for that model.  Pepski’s vehicle was equipped with the original equipment carpet mats. Why does the investigation tie these two incidents together? Pepski says that the agency came out ready to persuade him that the floor mat was to blame, even though that didn’t square with his experience of pulling up the accelerator pedal, as well as pushing down on it.  Both NHTSA and Toyota have demonstrated how an all-weather floor mat can cause the bottom edge of the accelerator pedal to catch, but the company and agency are notably silent on how the carpeted mat causes pedal interference.

If this is all due to errant floor mats, we have some questions:

Why do Toyota/Lexus models experience SUA absent all weather floor mats?

What changed in the floor mat design in 2002, when the complaint rates significantly increase?

How can a floor mat entrap a pedal during highway driving, when the operator has been driving steadily and does not depress the accelerator?

If Toyota/Lexus vehicle have floor mats so badly designed that they have killed at least 16 individuals and injured at least 243 injuries in SUA events, why is Toyota just getting around to fixing it now?

Why is Toyota claiming that floor mats are the cause of SUA incidents in vehicles not part of the floor mat recall?  If they are causing SUA, shouldn’t they be recalled too?

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