Well, here we are, 14 months after Toyota began admitting to the world that it could no longer design a simple pedal, a floor mat or a floor pan, by launching Phase I of many phases of a recall to replace all-weather floor mats that may entrap the accelerator. Initially, the recall 90L, the mother of all floor mat recalls, was meant to switch those sneaky little All-Weather Floor Mats out of 3.8 million Toyota and Lexus vehicles. (See Toyota All-Weather Floor Mat Entrapment) Continue reading
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, the National Transportation Safety Board recommended that motor coaches be equipped with seat belts. And for nearly a quarter of a century, bus manufacturers have been quite adept at ensuring that never happens. Compartmentalization, don’t you know. No need. Envelope of safety, and all that.
In August, however, U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood announced a proposed rulemaking that would require new motor coaches to have lap-shoulder belts. Specifically, the new regulation would establish a new definition for motor coaches and amend FMVSS 208, Occupant Crash Protection, to require the installation of lap/shoulder belts at all driver and passenger seating positions, and the installation of lap/shoulder belts at driver seating positions of large school buses. (Six states, Florida, Texas, California, Louisiana, New Jersey and New York, and some municipalities currently require seat belts on school buses.) Continue reading
Too bad Martin Truex Jr.’s Toyota NASCAR wasn’t equipped with an electronic throttle. ‘Cause if it did, no way would he have taken that hard hit in the turn at the Martinsville Speedway yesterday.
The veteran NASCAR driver emerged from his flaming Toyota unscathed – and puzzled.
“We had a throttle stuck wide open – not sure why,” Truex said to The News Virginian. “There’s a lot of big chunks of rubber flying around out there. I don’t know if one of those got up in the carburetor linkage or what, but just never had any warning. Went to let off to go into three and it was stuck to the floor. Not much you can do at that point here.”
We’re not sure all the theories have been explored. Did he check his floor mat? Was NASA consulted?
The commentators noted that Truex appeared as though he couldn’t slow his vehicle down – and maybe lost his brakes. Those guys apparently hadn’t got the memo that the brakes on a Toyota always overcome the throttle. They are two separate systems, and a stuck throttle and simultaneous brake failure isn’t possible. We’re serious. Toyota’s told that one to a lot of customers who complained that they crashed because their Toyota or Lexus took off on them and braking didn’t help.
[flashvideo file=video/2011_MartinsvilleNASCARCrash.flv image=”video/2011_MartinsvilleNASCARCrash_Preview.jpg” /]Now we know that a race track is not I-95, that a NASCAR professional is no muddled blue-hair, and that the vehicle in question had a mechanical throttle instead of the vaunted, never-to-be defeated ETCS-i.
And yet. And yet, Truex’s observations – no warning, happened too fast to avoid a crash – ring more bells than a Jehovah’s witness.
This month, the Insurance Institute on Highway Safety reignited efforts to address the underride problem and petitioned the federal government to “require stronger underride guards that will remain in place during a crash and to mandate guards for more large trucks and trailers.”
The Institute based its latest effort on a study using the Large Truck Crash Causation Study, a federal database of roughly 1,000 real-world crashes in 2001-03. The organization examined crash patterns leading to rear underride of heavy trucks and semi-trailers with and without guards and found that underride was a common outcome of the 115 crashes involving a passenger vehicle striking the back of a heavy truck or semi-trailer. Only 22 percent of the crashes didn’t involve underride or had only negligible underride, which they indicated was consistent with prior studies. The study noted that “In 23 of the 28 cases in which someone in the passenger vehicle died, there was severe or catastrophic underride damage, meaning the entire front end or more of the vehicle slid beneath the truck.” Continue reading
Fuel “spit-back” through the filler neck has been a longstanding problem in several Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep models, caused by the Inlet Check Valve (ICV) mounted in the fuel tank. Despite some limited recalls and at least one extended lifetime warranty, this defect, which first surfaced in 2001, continues to plague a number of models. Tens of thousands of vehicles are outside of any campaign, forcing owners to pay for a repair that requires replacement of the entire tank assembly.
Numerous Dodge Durango owners have complained to NHTSA and Chrysler. Others have commiserated about “spit back” on Internet blogs and enthusiast websites, and posted dramatic video footage showing geysers of gasoline or significant fuel dumps into the concrete around the pump.
The video below was captured by David Trebacz, the owner of a 2007 Dodge Durango. Continue reading
Dear Toyota:
Why did you buy back Tim Scott’s 2007 Lexus RX? We mean, really? You gave him a bunch of different reasons, but he doesn’t believe you. (We’re finding it a little hard to swallow, too.)
Awaiting your reply,
SRS
Here’s Tim Scott’s story. In early December, as NHTSA and NASA were putting the finishing touches on their reports saying that there is nothing wrong with Toyota’s electronics or software, Scott experienced an unintended acceleration event in his 2007 Lexus RX350, on his way home from the gym. Here’s the narrative that Scott, 46, the chief financial officer for the International Union of Police Associations, wrote: Continue reading
Today, Safety Research & Strategies called on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the industry to correct a longstanding safety problem: seat heaters that injure disabled drivers and passengers. With no government or industry-wide standards, manufacturers have installed a variety of seat heater systems – some that reach temperatures significantly above human tolerances or have no automatic shut-off mechanism – or both. While most drivers know when to turn a hot seat off, occupants with lower body sensory deficits don’t feel the burn. The medical literature has been documenting serious and permanent burn injuries from car seat heaters to occupants with paralysis or diabetes since 2003. Disabled motorists have been complaining about the problem to NHTSA since, at least, 2002. The industry’s response has been to bury a warning in the owner’s manual. NHTSA’s approach to seat heater defects has been: no flames, no problem. These are preventable injuries – and it’s time government and industry began preventing them.
The medical community has joined us in this campaign. We encourage readers to do the same by sending NHTSA, The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, and the National Mobility Equipment Dealers Association letters supporting changes in standards and practices.
See below to read our briefing paper and our requests to NHTSA and the industry:
Feb. 22, 2011 Safety Research & Strategies, Seat Heater Injuries
Feb. 22, 2011 Letter to NHTSA Administrator David Strickland
Last week, NHTSA pitched its two technical tomes on Toyota unintended acceleration at a pack of reporters, declared that the automaker’s electronics were fine, and ran away. Our esteemed Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood then made the media rounds, grousing that the critics hadn’t read the report, which leads us to ask: Did Ray?
We’ve been reading it and re-reading it, and conferring with a wide range of technical experts – some of whom have extensive experience in engine management control design, validation and testing. And we gotta tell you, Ray, we aren’t ready to buy our kid a new Toyota.
Far from exonerating Toyota electronics, the reports by NHTSA and the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) confirm the paucity of the automaker’s safety diagnostics. The NESC team also identifies how the two signals in the accelerator pedal position sensor can be shorted in the real world – leading to an open throttle (aka, tin whiskers). Hell, NESC found the potential in three pedals – that’s a pretty significant percentage in a very small sample. Tin whiskers are such a serious issue that NASA has devoted considerable resources to studying them. They have wreaked electronic havoc on everything from medical devices to weapons systems and satellites. Yet, the NESC report treated the discovery of tin whiskers in a third of their pedal sample like a dead end, instead of a promising avenue of study. Continue reading
In his characteristically colorful way, Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood told reporters today: “We enlisted the best and brightest engineers to study Toyota’s electronics system, and the verdict is in. There is no electronic-based cause for unintended, high-speed acceleration in Toyotas.”
LaHood issued this scientific proclamation based on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration “rigorous” examination of nine Toyotas in which the drivers complained about Sudden Unintended Acceleration.
Well, case closed.
We don’t think the story’s over – not by a long shot. First, we might argue that engaging engineers whose expertise is not automotive engine controls does not constitute “the best and brightest” minds in this particular instance. Second, no scientist worth his or her boots would make such a claim. In fact, NASA didn’t. That agency said:
“Due to system complexity which will be described and the many possible electronic software and hardware systems interactions it is not realistic to prove that the ETCSi cannot cause UAs. Today’s vehicles are sufficiently complex that no reasonable amount of analysis or testing can prove electronics and software have no errors. Therefore, absence of proof that the ETCSi caused a UA does not vindicate the system.”
We will be providing more analysis of the NHTSA-NASA report after we’ve had a chance to digest its findings. Stay tuned.
While NHTSA and NASA have been busy in their test labs, we’ve been busy doing some testing of our own. And, although our findings are preliminary, we’re uncovering important clues to the gaps in Toyota’s electronic safety net. We haven’t seen NHTSA’s report, but we’re hearing the sound of hands dusting themselves off and feet walking away. What’s troubling is examinations of the complaint data consistently show statistically significant increases in SUA complaints in Toyota models when equipped with its Electronic Throttle Control system. (See Quality Control Systems Corporation’s What NHTSA’s Data Can Tell Us about Unintended Acceleration and Electronic Throttle Control Systems for more information.) Toyota has replicated these incidents, as reported in field technical reports. (See Toyota Replicated Incidents for more information.)
Detailed evaluations of various Toyota models with ETC have revealed some fascinating design issues that demonstrate weaknesses in Toyota’s electronic architecture. In short, their designs don’t have enough computing power to integrate ETC into the engine control and incorporate safety features needed to prevent unwanted events.
Because the algorithms that make up the software in Toyota’s engine controllers are overly simplistic they are incapable of providing a robust electronic safety net that is needed in these types of systems.
The simplified software strategies used in Toyotas demonstrate this lack of computing power and software. It is important to note that none of the physical components need to change to accommodate safety features, they are software driven, yet these key software features are not there. Following is an overview of some of the areas that we’ve examined related to design features that exemplify this problem.
Throttle learn/ Spring test:
There is a parameter in the Toyota engine controller referred to as the “Throttle Learned Value.” Throttle learning is done to account for part-to-part variations and adjusts the sensor reading up or down by an offset based on the physical components. The effect is that the entire pedal-to-throttle curve will shift up or down in response to this value. This is very evident on pedal-follower type systems such as on the 2005 Camry. What happens if the reference position is not what it was assumed to be? In short, the entire relationship of sensor voltage to throttle angle can be skewed causing more engine output than the driver requested. This condition has been documented to cause short duration UA events.
The spring self test is an important safety check performed by the engine controller when the key is on and before the car starts. The controller opens the throttle very briefly and monitors the return spring closing. This basic safety test is designed to check the response of the throttle body return spring to ensure throttle open / close response is functioning appropriately from a mechanical standpoint and gauges the dynamic response of the actuator before the engine is started. There is no such test in the Toyota models. This is important because it illuminates the lack of system integration between the electronic controller and the mechanical components they control
Pedal-Follower
Many Toyota vehicles with ETC use a pedal-follower system. This system has significant limitations and doesn’t address the core concern which is engine torque output. Nor do the subsystems in a pedal-follower system communicate in a manner that facilitates a more complete control of the engine.
Level Two Engine Diagnostics
Primary diagnostics are designed to catch faults conditions usually of an electrical nature. Secondary, or Level-2 diagnostics, are rationality tests designed to catch unanticipated anomalies and to the monitor the basic functions of engine control system. This is used to check the actual engine torque versus driver input, and mitigate if necessary.
Some Toyota ETC systems examined appear to have a complete absence of secondary or Level-2 engine torque diagnostics. The lack of this safety net presents opportunities for undetected faults to create unwanted events.
Brake Override
Electronic brake override in an ETC system was originally a feature designed to address a physical stuck pedal condition. If the pedal is stuck but sending a valid signal to the engine controller and the driver is braking, the accelerator pedal voltage signal is overridden (via an algorithm in the software) and the engine is returned to idle. Toyota has “re-flashed” some late model vehicles with a brake override in recall 90L. However, the company claims that a similar software re-flash cannot be accomplished on most of their vehicles because of the lack of computing power.
Cruise Control
Inputs on Toyota models appear to have no redundancy. This is an atypical design compared to other OEMs. This lack of redundancy creates the potential for failures and misinterpretations of the cruise control status due to potential electrical faults.
Accelerator Pedal Position Sensors (APPS)
Most manufacturers use a triple redundancy on the APPS. The Toyota APPS design differs in the effectiveness of the second sensor. While it is a separate sensor, it doesn’t have a different characteristic in the voltage slope which can result in “blindness” to certain external voltage influences. There are also concerns associated with the calibration of the sensor agreement diagnostic logic.
(See Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Investigation: Preliminary Report )
Idle control:
Toyota allows a wide-range of idle deviation without setting Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs). Idle speed variations in excess of 2,000 RPMs have been documented in real-world conditions without driver input. This level of idle generates a substantial amount of engine torque and can result in UA events.
If we take a moment to consider the big picture, we see regulators that have failed to regulate and the investigators have failed to investigate. They’ve set themselves back – and in the process – all of the motoring public.
